THE growth of scientific disciplines, as
of many other phenomena, can be represented by an S-shaped curve.' First there is a long period, going back to prehistory, during which there are various ups and downs but no continuous growth; this is followed by a spurt of accelerated growth; eventually the development slows down and approaches a ceiling.2 This typical pattern is obtained whether one uses as the index of growth the numbers of publications, discoveries, or people doing research in the subject; the pattern corresponds well with the intuitive picture one obtains from the histories of the different sciences.
The process, as presented in the accounts of scientific development, can be presented schematically as follows. Ideas beget ideas until the time is ripe for a new and coherent system of thought and research to arise. Thenceforth the system possesses a life of its own. It is identified as a new field of science, is eventually given a name of its own (such as chemistry or psychology), and grows rapidly into maturity. This still leaves open the question of beginnings. If the whole story consisted of ideas begetting ideas, then growth would have to start at an exponentially accelerating rate (to a point of saturation) right from the first relevant idea. Since this does not happen, it has to be assumed either that only a few ideas are capable of generating new ones-the rest simply being sterile-or that ideas are not self-generating, and, even if potentially fertile, have to be carried from person to person and implanted in some special way in order to give rise to new generation.
Common sense indicates that both state-ments are true. Not all original ideas are fertile, and some potentially fertile ideas are lost or left unused because they are not communicated effectively. Nevertheless histories of science have concentrated on the first type of explanation. If an idea has no historical consequences, the historian of ideas will take it for granted that something must have been at fault with the idea. Conversely, when an idea with a seemingly not-so-brilliant beginning proves capable of further growth, he will assume that it must have had hidden qualities which ensured its success. Obviously he will find no difficulty after the fact in demonstrating the correctness of flis hunches.
In this paper, we shall pursue the other tack. Instead of trying to show what inherent qualities made one idea fertile and another infertile, we shall ask how it happened that at a certain point in time the transmission and diffusion of ideas relating to a given field became strikingly increased in effectiveness. Instead of contemplating the internal structure of intellectual mutations,3 we shall concentrate on the environmental mechanisms which determine the selection of mutations. Specifically, we postulate that: (1) the ideas necessary for the creation of a new discipline are usually available over a relatively prolonged period of time and in several places;4 (2) only a few of these potential beginnings lead to further growth; (3) such growth occurs where and when persons become interested in the new idea, not only as intellectual content but also as a potential means of establishing a new intellectual identity and particularly a new occupational role; and (4) the conditions under which such interest arises can be identified and used as the basis for eventually building a predictive theory.
THE CASE OF PSYCHOLOGY: THE TAKE-OFF INTO ACCELERATED GROWTH
The earliest beginnings of psychology reach back into prehistory. Explanations of human thought and behavior are inherent in every language; with the rise of philosophies, more abstract and systematic formulations came into being. Finally, in the nineteenth century, the methods of natural science were applied to the subject. Using publications in experimental and physiological psychology as an index of the growth of modern scientific psychology, we find that the acceleration started about 1870, and that the period of rapid growth was reached about 1890. (Table 1) .. 5 The place where accelerated growth began can be ascertained from comparisons of the growth in different countries. The pattern is similar to that found in other nineteenth century sciences. The main development occurs in Germany, to be continued in the twentieth century in the United States, with a much more modest growth in Britain. For a while France also seems to develop strongly, but production there declines soon after the initial spurt around the turn of the century (Table 2. ) Moreover, French development seems to have been isolated from the mainstream; it has been quoted in major textbooks less than its relative share in production of publications would indicate. (Table 3) .
These are the data to be explained. Since the conditions under which something new is created are not necessarily the same as the conditions under which the innovation is effectively received somewhere else, we shall confine ourselves to the explanation of the take-off, and leave the analysis of the diffusion of the new field for another discussion.
PROCEDURE
Originally the subject matter of psychologv was divided between speculative DhiThis is not to say that such contemplation is necessarily useless. Its potential utility depends on finding identifiable characteristics which predict what is and what is not a "fertile" idea.
4This accords with the oft-noted phenomenon of multiple discoveries in science. Cf. Robert K. Merton, "Singletons and Multiples in Scientific Discovery: A Chapter in the Sociology of Science," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 105 (1961), pp. 471-486. 5These publications do not represent the total number of reports of experimental and physiological researches in psychology, but rather review articles, books, and papers dealing with the theory and methodology of experimental and physiological psychology. Complete tables of research reports are not available for this period; however, this particular bibliography may be more useful for our purposes than they would have been. It represents a set of self-conscious summaries of scientific work in the field; therefore it indicates the rise of interest in scientific psychology better than would a collection of researches which may not at the time have been considered relevant to psychology. (2) Also excluded are those natural scientists, principally physiologists, whose experiments can be retrospectively included in psychology, but whose identification was clearly with the natural sciences. Psychiatrists are also excluded: at the time in question, they belonged to a medical discipline which was quite independent of philosophy, and thus of psychology. Moreover, their theories were rather self-consciously based on the views of nineteenth-century medical science.7 (3) Finally, we must make an operational distinction among three categories of persons: forerunners, founders, and followers. The first two are distinguished by whether or not they had students who became psychologists. An example of a forerunner would be the scientific dilettante-such as Francis Galton. These men did not consider themselves psychologists, nor were they so identified by their contemporaries. Generally they remained isolated from any specific discipline until historians of the science-which was created by other forces-offered them a posthumous home.
Those who were not themselves the students of psychologists, but who trained their own disciplines as psychologists, are the founders of the new discipline of psychology. Their disciples are the followers. The latter two classes can be considered psychologists proper. What we have referred to as "discipleship"-the fact of having studied under a man, or having worked under him as a laboratory assistant-is, we believe, an adequate measure of the existence of a consciously self-perpetuating identity, a "movement" or discipline. The use of purely objective criteria in establishing such lines of descent has the disadvantage that we may misjudge the extent of actual influence and identification, but the overall picture should be accurate.
The names to be classified are taken from five histories of psychology, including ones written in each of the countries to be examined.8 For Germany and the United States, all names between 1800 and 1910 were taken. Beyond the latter date, the numbers of psychologists in these countries become so great that the histories are necessarily selective; moveover, scientific psychology was well into its second and third generations in these countries by this point. For Britain and France, all names between 1800 and In France, the names of numerous psychiatrists and some physiologists and biologists were excluded, leaving 10 names (Figure 3) . Two men comprising the Swiss school can be traced back to Wundt; one-Victor Henri-worked with Mifller, although he had previously worked with Alfred Binet- 10 Clearly, those charts do not represent the total population of such psychologists for this period, and men may appear to have no psychological followers only because they are not listed in the texts from which the names are drawn. Nevertheless, we feel justified in using this form of measurement of the rise of a discipline, because the visibility of the men who form such a movement is an important factor in its existence.
" Fechner was a retired physicist who devoted many years to writing pantheistic, anti-materialistic philosophical works. His writings met with little success, due to the reaction against Idealism that had developed by the mid-nineteenth century. In 1850, he took up the physiologist E. H. Weber's experiments on touch and muscle sense, in an attempt to establish mathematical laws of perception. This research, however, was an integral part of Fechner's pantheistic system; the laws of psychophysics were intended to give a demonstrable proof to his belief that mind and matter were aspects of the same thing, and he went on to propose an explanation of the entire physical world as composed of souls related to each other by material bodies. , for a discussion of how sciences are able to make cumulative advances because they are integrated around a particular "paradigm" or model of scientific reality, with its implied methodology and research directions. Of course, it can be argued that psychology even today still lacks overwhelming consensus around a central, reality-defining theory of the sort that Kuhn means by a "paradigm," and that the term should be used only in such fields as physics which do have such a theory. We have used the term here more broadly, to refer to the necessity of a new discipline to have at least minimal consensus on the boundaries of the subject matter upon which its practitioners will focus their attention, and on an acceptable range of research methods. Germany, then, is where the crucial conditions for the innovation of scientific psychology are to be sought. Ideas which could have given rise to a cumulative tradition could be found outside of Germany. In fact, towards the end of the nineteenth century, France nearly rivalled Germany as a center for such ideas. But as shown in Table 2 , French production declined rapidly after a momentary peak around 1900, while German, American, and, to a much lesser extent, British work continued to grow. Fig-ures 1-4 indicate that only in Germany had there developed an autonomous network for the regular transmission and reception of the new ideas. Subsequently the U. S. and later Britain linked up with this network, and the U. S. eventually became its center. France only partially linked up with it and it did not develop a network of its own. In the absence of such a network, innovations remained isolated events; only the existence of networks could make them into a cumulative process. 13 We shall not here follow the entire story of the creation of communication networks and their diffusion from country to country, but shall confine ourselves to the original establishment of the German network. For this purpose, all the other countries will be treated as negative instances, with Germany as the sole positive case. The question to be answered is: Why did an effective network for the communication of these new ideas develop only in Germany?
ROLE-HYBRIDIZATION
The answer is that the conditions for the establishment of a new professional role variety, committed to the new field, existed only in Germany. Ideas which are not cultivated by people whose regular jobs are to cultivate them are like souls hovering in a mythological limbo before entering a body. They can light upon the dreams or the imagination of one person here and another one there, of someone who lives today or of someone else who will be born in a thousand years. If, however, ideas become the end-products of scientific roles, they can be likened to genes which are transmitted from generation to generation through a reliable and natural process; under normal conditions, they will not only survive but increase.
There are several ways in which new scientific role varieties arise. The present instance is a case of role-hybridization: the individual moving from one role to another, such as from one profession or academic field to another, may be placed at least momentarily in a position of role conflict.14 This conflict can be resolved by giving up the attitudes and behaviors appropriate to the old role and adopting those of the new role; in this case, identification with the old reference group must be withdrawn. However, the individual may be unwilling to give up his identification with his old reference group, as it may carry higher status (intellectual as well as perhaps social) than his new group. In this case, he may attempt to resolve the conflict by innovating, i.e. fitting the methods and techniques of the old role to the materials of the new one, with the deliberate purpose of creating a new role.
Examples of scientific roles created by this process are psychoanalysis, which was created by a man who moved from the prestigious profession of scientific research to the relatively lower-status occupation of German medical practice; Freud attempted to maintain his status by trying to raise medical practice into a form of scientific research, and as a result created psychoanalysis. Similarly, Pasteur gave rise to bacteriology by maintaining his theoretical perspectives after moving into research on wine fermentation, and elaborated his discovery into a new specialty.
Mobility of scholars from one field to another will occur when the chances of success (i.e., getting recognition, gaining a full chair at a relatively early age, making an outstanding contribution) in one discipline are poor, often as a result of overcrowding in a field in which the number of positions is stable. In such cases, many scholars will be likely to move into any related fields in which the conditions of competition are better. In some cases, this will mean that they move into a field with a standing relatively lower than their original field.15 This creates the conditions for role conflict. Of course, not everyone placed in such a position will choose to or be able to innovate a new role, nor is it possible to predict exactly which individuals will do so. It is possible, however, to say that the chances of such a major innovation occurring in a discipline into which there is mobility from a higher-status discipline are considerably greater than in a discipline into which there is no such mobility, or which stands higher in status than the discipline from which mobility takes place. For example, if physiology has higher standing in an academic system than philosophy, but competitive conditions are better in the latter than in the former, one might expect a role-hybridization in which physiological methods will be applied to the material of philosophy (at their most adjacent point, psychology) in order to differentiate the innovator from the more traditional practitioners of the less respected discipline. This would not be expected if philosophy's status were equal or higher, or if the competitive conditions in philosophy were equal or worse than those in physiology.
Moreover, since a major academic innovation has a chance of success only if it can attract a sizable following, it is usually not enough (except perhaps in cases of striking utility, such as bacteriology), that an individual innovator be placed in a situation of role conflict. The conditions have to be general so as to ensure a widespread response to the innovation. The motivation of the man who merely joins such a movement is quite similar to that of the man who begins itmoving into a discipline of lower standing than his old one, he is likely to welcome the opportunity to raise his status through adopting the innovation. Even more importantly, the existence of such relationships between disciplines may have a vicarious effect upon individuals within the system who do not personally move from the high-status discipline to the low-status discipline. For example, the younger men in the low-status field may attempt to upgrade themselves by borrowing the methods of a high-status field. The simplest way to upgrade themselves would be to move to the other field, but they are restrained from doing this by the differences in competitive conditions. If they do not make the innovation themselves, they may be very receptive to an innovation by a migrating scientist. Even young scholars who have not yet chosen a field, knowing the relative prestige and conditions of competition in the several fields, will be attracted to the new hybridized role.
It is important to distinguish role-hybridization from what might be termed "ideahybridization," the combination of ideas taken from different fields into a new intellectual synthesis. The latter does not attempt to bring about a new academic or professional role, nor does it generally give rise to a coherent and sustained movement with a permanent tradition.
Antecedents of modern psychology as far back as Descartes had discussed psychological functioning in a physiological perspective, but without giving rise to any movement to extend these ideas as other sciences were doing with their respective materials. Similar connections were made by the British associationists, from John Locke and David Hartley up to Alexander Bain, James Ward, and James Sully at the end of the 19th century, but without giving any indication that a continuous scientific tradition 15 For the scholar or scientist, this is not simply a matter of social status or prestige, but rather of the effectiveness or ability of the field to make progress as judged by its own intellectual standards. Cf. Hagstrom, op. cit., pp. 9-104, for a theoretical exposition of science as a form of social organization in which competition for recognition by the colleague group is a prime mechanism of control; see also pp. 208-220 for a general discussion of disciplinary differentiation. would ever result from these theories. In Germany, Herbart and Lotze certainly fall into this category, along with Fechner, who introduced experimental methods into philosophical psychology in the 1850's with his psychophysics, but who did not thereby create any movement to reform the role of the psychologist-philosopher. Galton in England, and in France, such men as Ribot, Beaunis, and Binet must be considered more "idea-hybrids" than "role-hybrids"; rather than creating a new role, they merely added another facet to the established role of the multi-purpose intellectual such as had existed in these countries since the seventeenth century. Finally, William James in the United States would fall into the category of an "idea-hybrid," particularly since he finally decided on the traditional role of philosopher rather than the new role of scientific psychologist.
THE POSITIVE CASE
In the German universities of the 19th century, physiology was a highly productive, expanding science. One of its greatest periods of productivity took place between 1850 and 1870, when most of the chairs of physiology were first split off from anatomy. Fifteen chairs were created between 1850 and 1864. After that date, the field rapidly reached a limit of approximately one chair per university in a system comprising 19 universities before 1870 and 20 after 1870.16 Table 4 shows that physiology, with approximately half as many chairs as philosophy, added only two full chairs from 1873-1910, whereas philosophy, already the largest field in the universities, added eight. The number of Extraordinary Professors and Privatdozents in physiology grew much more rapidly during this period than in philosophy. But these were poorly paid and largely honorific positions; their number indicates something of the competitive pressures in these fields for the truly desirable positions, the full professorships. Advancement was particularly difficult in physiology, since most of its full chairs, having been created at about the same time, were filled with men of about the same age who held them for decades.'7 Table 5 shows that in the 1850's, the chances of becoming a full professor were better for those habilitating in the medical sciences than in the philosophical disciplines. In the next decade, however, the situation was reversed and the relative competitive situation within the medical sciences steadily wors- ened through the rest of the century. Clearly, from about 1860 on, philosophy offered much more favorable competitive conditions than did physiology. The first condition for the occurrence of role-hybridization was thus present. The second condition was provided by the trend of the prestige conflict that raged between philosophy and the natural sciences throughout the nineteenth century in Germany. Before 1830, the great systems of Idealism claimed for philosophy the position of a super-science, deriving by speculation all that might be painstakingly discovered by empirical methods. But these pretensions were shattered by the rapidly expanding natural sciences, led first by the chemists, then by the physiologists. Paulsen notes the contempt in which speculative philosophy came to be held after the rise of the sciences in the 1830's, a contempt which was receding only at the end of the century.18 Hermann von Helmholtz, the physicist and physiologist, was the leading propagandist for the scientific attack on philosophical speculation; in his student days in 1845 in Before Wundt began to take philosophv as a second reference group, he was doing the same kind of things that Helmholtz, Hering, Frans Donders, and many other physiologists were doing-experimenting on the functions of the sense-organs and the nervous system, and occasionally pointing out that their work made speculative philosophy a superfluous anachronism. Wundt had once been an assistant to Helmholtz, the leader of the anti-philosophical movement; Wundt's move into philosophy must have been an acute identity crisis for him, which could be resolved only by innovating a new philosophical method.22 Using Fechner's empirical methods of studying perception, Wundt proposed to build metaphysics on a solid basis, thus making philosophy a science.23 To preserve his scientific status, he was forced not only to carry out a revolution in philosophy by replacing logical speculation with empirical research, but also to widely advertise the fact that he was in a different kind of enterprise than the traditional philosophers. Brentano, Stumpf, MUller, and Ebbinghaus were all philosophers who became interested in using empirical methods in their field. Apparently, they were aware of the onslaught physiology was making into the territory of philosophy; rather than accept its deteriorating position, they in effect "went over to the enemy." It is known that Stumpf met Fechner and E. H. Weber in his days as a Dozent; 24 Muller also corresponded with Fechner; 25 and Ebbinhaus apparently decided to re-enter the academic world after accidentally encountering a copy of Fechner's Elements.26 Brentano, although he makes reference to Helmholtz, Fechner, and Wundt in his first major work, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874), was considerably less influenced by them than were the others. He also remained the least experimental of this group of founders. Wundt is undoubtedly the central figure. He had the largest following and he articulated the ideology of the "philosophical revolution" most clearly. The others, originally philosophers, put the position less strongly and had smaller personal followings. Yet they were role-hybrids to some extent, as clearly appears when one compares them with Fechner. The latter had the decisive idea, but was content to write about it and submit it to what Derek de Solla Price calls "the general archives of science." The philosophers, however, influenced by the example of Wundt, used it for the creation of a new role variety.
THE NEGATIVE CASES
In France, there was no innovation of using experimental methods in philosophy. There was heavy competition in the French academic system for positions in all the natural sciences; the physiologists were fairly hard-pressed, having fewer than one chair per university even at the turn of the century (Table 6 ). The number of available tion between disciplines were too amorphous to mean anything for a man like Binet, who could afford to dabble in law, entomology, psychiatry, experimental psychology, and educational testing. He could expect that some kind of facilities would be created for his patricular needs, and that his achievements would be recognized without the need for justifying them in the terms of a specific academic discipline.
Existing positions allowed a broad range of possible activities for their holders; Lucien Levy-Bruhl, the anthropologist, for example, held a chair of philosophy; Emile Durkheim, the sociologist, held a chair of education, and the few chairs of experimental psychology were likely to be turned over to men who were primarily psychiatrists such as Pierre Janet or Charles Blondel. The College de France, the most prestigious institution in France, rewarded unique individual accomplishments, but did not provide much opportunity for those following an established career, nor did it allow the training of "disciples," since its positions were for research rather than teaching. Ribot, by proselytizing German psychology, could have a new chair in Experimental Psychology established for himself at the College de France, but this personal recognition probably prevented him from developing a school of followers. The purely individual basis of recognition is indicated by the fact that Henri Pieron could have a new chair created for himself at the College de France (in the Physiology of Sensation) because the Professor of Archeology died without a suitably eminent successor.28
Unlike in the German system, disciplines were not differentiated sharply enough to create serious role conflicts among men with ideas. The elite comprised a single reference group of relatively non-specialized intellectuals and "philosophers" in the old eighteenth century tradition, and prestige adhered to the individual, not to the discipline. The French system, in short, was suited to picking up intellectual innovations by specific individuals, but was not at all suited for giving rise to movements attempting to create a new discipline.
The same conditions which prevented the development of a reference group conflict in France existed to an even greater extent in Britain. The relative number of chairs in philosophy and physiology was similar to that in France (Table 7) . Both were about one per university, with chairs in philosophy in a slight lead over those in physiology, but with the latter expanding. The necessity of gaining an academic position was even less important than in France. In the latter country, one eventually had to obtain some kind of official position. In England, even this was unnecessary.
Before 1832, there were only two universities in all England and four in Scotland, and they were little more than an upper-class intellectual backwater. Four provincial universities were founded throughout the remainder of the century and another half dozen in the first decade of the twentieth century. Under the threat of being left behind by these technologically-minded, "lower-class" universities, Oxford and Cambridge began to take in the new sciences, and in the process, to recover intellectual as well as merely social pre-eminence.9
This process was still going on in the late nineteenth century; both philosophy and physiology were still centered to a considerable extent outside of the British universities.30 From the point of view of the physi- 
